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ABSTRACT 
The control automation and interaction paradigm (e.g., manual, autopilot, flight 
management system) used on virtually all large highly automated aircraft has long 
been an exemplar of breakdowns in human factors and human-centered design.  An 
alternative paradigm is the Haptic Flight Control System (HFCS) that is part of 
NASA Langley Research Center’s Naturalistic Flight Deck Concept. The HFCS 
uses only stick and throttle for easily and intuitively controlling the actual flight of 
the aircraft without losing any of the efficiency and operational benefits of the 
current paradigm. Initial prototypes of the HFCS are being evaluated and this paper 
describes one such evaluation. In this evaluation we examined claims regarding 
improved situation awareness, appropriate workload, graceful degradation, and 
improved pilot acceptance.  
Twenty-four instrument-rated pilots were instructed to plan and fly four 
different flights in a fictitious airspace using a moderate fidelity desktop simulation.  
Three different flight control paradigms were tested: Manual control, Full 
Automation control, and a simplified version of the HFCS. Dependent variables 
included both subjective (questionnaire) and objective (SAGAT) measures of 
situation awareness, workload (NASA-TLX), secondary task performance, time to 
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recognize automation failures, and pilot preference (questionnaire).  
The results showed a statistically significant advantage for the HFCS in a 
number of measures. Results that were not statistically significant still favored the 
HFCS. The results suggest that the HFCS does offer an attractive and viable 
alternative to the tactical components of today’s FMS/autopilot control system. The 
paper describes further studies that are planned to continue to evaluate the HFCS. 
1  INTRODUCTION  
There have been many criticisms of the current flight management/autoflight 
system in modern aircraft (Weiner, 1998). In 1996, the FAA determined that a 
major problem with the modern flight deck was the disconnect between the pilot 
and the autoflight systems in the aircraft (Abbott, et. al, 1996). This disconnect led 
to instances where pilots would remark, “Why is the aircraft doing that?” or 
“What’s it doing now?”  There are many ways to frame and consider these problems 
in terms of human factors. The perspective considered in this paper is one of 
languages and interfaces. After framing the problem in this way, the paper briefly 
describes the Haptic Flight Control System (HFCS) and the potential benefits of the 
HFCS. Next, it describes a simulation study that evaluated some of these benefits.  
1.1  Languages and interfaces 
There are three ‘languages’ that the pilot uses to command the modern highly 
automated aircraft. The first is manipulating the control surfaces and propulsion 
systems via the control inceptors, that is, stick, rudder and throttles. Examples of the 
commands are pitch up, bank left, and increase thrust. The mapping of the 
commands onto the actions on the control inceptors is intuitive. Pull back to pitch 
up, turn right to bank right, push the throttles forward for more thrust.  
The second language is based on direction and speed. The commands in this 
language are heading commands, airspeed commands, altitude and altitude rate 
commands. These commands are usually made through the knobs and dials on the 
autoflight system.  
The third language is one of earth-referenced locations and clock time. It is by 
far the richest language. The pilot can specify an approach into Reagan National 
Airport, a departure from Heathrow, a specific jetway in the airspace system, or a 
waypoint by its latitude and longitude. The commands are given to the FMS cockpit 
display unit through an alphanumeric keypad with single purpose and multi-use 
buttons. The language has an elaborate and rigid syntax.  
The pilot of a modern aircraft is faced with three different languages, using three 
different input devices and all three different systems can be controlling the aircraft 
in some combination at the same time.  Given the limitations of the human pilot, 
this design is a recipe for confusion, high memory workload, high display 
requirements, and miscommunication. This error-proneness is further exacerbated 
by the ability to preprogram route changes and arm modes – allowing for the 
passage of time between error commission (e.g., when the pilot sets a command) 
and the manifestation of that error (e.g., when the aircraft actually performs that 
command).  
We have developed a single flight control system that speaks all three languages 
and uses a single intuitive interface – it’s called the Haptic-Multimodal Flight 
Control System.   
1.2  The Haptic­Multimodal Flight Control System 
In the Haptic-Multimodal Flight Control System (HFCS), the pilot issues 
commands to the aircraft solely through the stick and throttle (Schutte, et al, 2007, 
Goodrich, et al, 2011).  The HFCS can best be described as a point and shoot 
interface. All of the route information currently in the FMS (e.g., waypoints and 
airway structure) is presented on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and the Map 
Display (MD). The pilot points the aircraft at one of these features, selects it, pulls 
the trigger on the stick and the automation then flies the aircraft according to the 
procedure in the database. To fly to a heading, the pilot simply turns the aircraft to 
that heading and pulls the trigger. Since no published procedure is selected, the 
automation holds that heading. If the aircraft is pointing at multiple features, the 
pilot can cycle through them and pull the trigger when the feature he wants is 
selected. If the pilot wants to arrive at the next waypoint at a certain time, he points 
the aircraft at that waypoint, pulls the trigger, then moves the throttle while 
watching the predicted arrival time to that waypoint (displayed on the PFD and 
MD). He adjusts the speed until it is at the desired arrival time, and pulls the trigger 
on the throttle. Even non-published commands such as fly parallel to a jetway can 
be easily performed. Nearly every tactical command that can be given to the current 
stick/autoflight/FMS combination can be accomplished through the two inceptors.  
The common elements between the pilot and the automation with regard to the 
control of the aircraft are the back-driven stick and throttle. When the automation 
moves the aircraft, the pilot can see and feel what the automation is doing by 
watching the controls and/or having a hand on the inceptor. When the pilot moves 
the aircraft using the inceptors, the automation is aware of what the pilot is doing.  
One feature that current automation has but is missing from HFCS is the ability 
to preprogram an entire route and then ‘set it and forget it’. While the pilot can plan 
the route on a separate planning device and display this plan on the PFD and MD, 
the automation will not fly the entire route – rather the pilot has to make all coarse 
turns and altitude changes. The automation will accomplish the individual features 
with all the efficiency of current automation, but the pilot must be in the loop 
whenever major changes in the aircraft’s trajectory are made. This lack of 
preprogramming provides a benefit from a human factors perspective. Humans 
become complacent with reasonably reliable pre-programmed automation. But one 
of their primary roles is to monitor the mission progress and the automation. In 
order to effectively monitor over long durations they need to be engaged in the task 
at regular intervals. Having the pilot perform the simple task of pointing the aircraft 
to the next goal can provide just such engagement. In the HFCS, the pilot will never 
ask what the aircraft is doing, because the pilot is the one that just commanded it to 
do it. 
One potential Achilles Heel for the HFCS is that the pilot must remember to 
reengage and make the next move. Humans in general have a very difficult time 
with this prospective memory – easily forgetting or becoming distracted. 
Automation, however does not suffer from this problem. So the automation is used 
to prompt the pilot (at various levels of interruption) that a move will soon need to 
be made, is pending, or has been missed. Thus if the HFCS is coupled to a jetway 
and is approaching a ‘fork in the road’ or decision point, the pilot will be given 
alerting cues. If the pilot has entered a plan (using a separate planning device), these 
cues can be more specific to the plan.  
At first glance, the single-point-of-control concept can appear to be a 
technological step backwards. In a modern flight deck, the pilot rarely has to touch 
the control inceptor. In fact, the use of the control inceptor to fly the aircraft is 
virtually the hallmark of the unautomated aircraft. The HFCS appears to be 
increasing pilot workload back to the levels of manual flight before automation. The 
purpose of this study is to explore how pilots feel about this new control concept 
and to see how it affects their workload and their situation awareness.  
2  METHOD 
2.1  Participants 
Twenty-four general aviation pilots were used as subjects. The subjects were all 
right-handed males with no color blindness. They were VFR-certified but not IFR-
certified. Each had more than 50 hours and fewer that 300 hours total flying time 
and they had logged between 12 and 48 hours in the 12 months prior to the 
experiment.  
2.2  Apparatus 
The experiment used a PC-based flight simulation environment (Figure 1). The 
aircraft model used was a simplified version of a deHaviland Dash-8. The control 
inceptor was an active, force feedback side arm controller made by Stirling 
Dynamics, Ltd. There were no throttles (speed was automatically controlled in all 
conditions) or rudder pedals. There were two main displays, a Primary Flight 
Display (PFD) and a Map Display (MD). In addition to the MD, there was a 
planning interface that was implemented on a tablet PC to the subject’s right. Three 
large out-the-window displays and a laptop computer were used to provide 
secondary tasking. 
 Figure -1: PC-based simulator 
2.3  Subject Task  
A test run for this experiment occurred in three phases. (1) Planning the route on 
paper, (2) entering the route into the electronic planner, and (3) flying that route 
using the simulator. 
Planning the route on paper - For this experiment, we created an airspace over a 
fictitious island consisting of seven airports. Each airport had one or two runways. 
The terminal area was defined by pathways that were used for departures and 
approaches. Aircraft could fly from airport to airport using 18 airways connected by 
eight waypoints. The prescribed flight altitude for all airways was 2500 ft. Each 
subject an origin and a destination along with necessary charts and airway 
instructions. The subject then highlighted the route on the paper charts. 
Entering the route into the electronic planner - The subject would take his paper 
map over to the electronic planner. He entered the route by ‘connecting the dots’ on 
the map. The route was then reviewed by both the subject and the experimenter. 
Then it was transmitted to the flight control and display system to be presented on 
the display (for all conditions) and used by the HFCS and Full Automation 
conditions to provide automated control.   
Flying that route using the simulator - The simulator was initialized to a fixed 
point along the route and was paused. The subject was responsible for flying the 
aircraft to its destination along the route that he had planned and entered. At 
different points in the simulation, the subject was requested to make one of three 
changes: a strategic change in the route, which consisted of him making a change to 
the flight plan but required no change in his flight trajectory at that time; a tactical 
change that required him to fly a route parallel to the planned route (supposedly to 
fly by traffic); and a parallel runway change on approach. The run was always 
terminated before touch down.  
2.4  Experimental Protocol 
Over a two-day period, each subject spent 12 hours in the study. The first half 
day consisted of training on all tasks. The subject flew the simulation in the Manual 
mode (i.e., no automation assistance) in order to become acquainted with the 
simulator handling and performance. In the second half, the subject was trained on 
the first automation condition (Manual, HFCS, Full Automation). He was given one 
of four routes to plan/fly. The conditions and routes (see below) were 
counterbalanced. The subject then filled out a post run questionnaire. After a break, 
he was trained on another condition, given another route to plan and fly. Again, he 
was given the post run questionnaire. The subject left for the day.  
The subject returned the next morning and was allowed to fly the simulator in 
the Manual mode to refresh his familiarity. Then the subject received training on the 
last condition and flew another run with this condition and route. After completing 
the post run questionnaire, the subject was given a break. The subject was then 
given one last route to plan and fly. One of the three automation conditions was 
assigned (counterbalanced). After the post run questionnaire, the subject was given 
a post experiment questionnaire and released. Thus each subject saw all three 
conditions at least once and saw one condition twice. 
2.5  Experimental Conditions  
There were three experimental conditions: Full Automation (FA), HFCS, and 
Manual. In all conditions, the subject received visual flight guidance on the PFD 
and MD as well as aural and tactile warnings of impending turns. PFD guidance 
used a tunnel in the sky with rings that the aircraft had to fly through. 
Full Automation: The subject had only to monitor the flight. The automation 
was always coupled to the flight plan. Any tactical changes (i.e., runway changes, 
side-step maneuvers) were made in the electronic planner. This condition represents 
the most automated functionality of modern aircraft.  
Haptic Flight Control System: The subject could lock on or couple to any 
straight line route segment (planned or published) and the automation would hold 
the aircraft on that segment. At the end of a segment, the automation would release 
control of the aircraft and the pilot would have to steer the aircraft onto the next 
segment. Once in the proximity of the next segment, the subject pulled the trigger 
on the side stick and the automation coupled to the path. When uncoupled to a path, 
the flight control system was essentially that of the Manual condition.  
Manual: In the Manual condition, the subject would hand fly the aircraft using 
the stick. They were instructed to follow the centerline of the route as displayed on 
the PFD and fly through tunnel rings. Random winds were introduced to move the 
aircraft off course if its attitude was not attended to by the subject.  
2.6  Run Definitions  
Four runs were used in the experiment. In each run the subject was given tactical 
and strategic changes such as might be given from Air Traffic Control. The tactical 
changes were introduced by having the subject either fly an offset parallel to the 
planned course or make a runway change while on approach. The strategic change 
involved a change in the flight plan that required no immediate movement of the 
aircraft. In addition, one run contained an automation failure where the automation 
was turned off with no alert. This meant that in the FA condition, the aircraft would 
remain in a turn (flying in circles) and in the HFCS condition, the automation could 
not be recoupled after the turn.  
2.7  Secondary Tasks 
Workload was increased for each subject by giving them two secondary tasks – 
a visual task and a cognitive task. The visual task required the subject to monitor the 
center out-the-window display and look for dots that randomly appeared and then 
disappeared. The dots had no operational significance. The cognitive secondary task 
was a simple addition of two double-digit numbers. Thus the subject could set his 
own pace regarding answering the math questions. The subject was told that flying 
the aircraft was always to be his highest priority.  
2.8  Dependent Variables 
The following dependent variables were recorded: Situation Awareness was 
recorded using SAGAT (Endsley, 1988) and subjective ratings. Workload was 
measured using the NASA-TLX (Hart and Staveland, 1998) and subjective ratings. 
Pilot Involvement was measured using subjective ratings. Secondary task 
performance was objectively measured. The time to recognize the automation 
failure was measured from the onset of the failure until the subject either verbalized 
the problem or corrected for the problem – whichever came first. Remaining 
subjective data was collected using questionnaires. 
2.9  Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Flight Situation Awareness for the HFCS condition will be higher 
than that of the FA condition. 
Hypothesis 2: Secondary Task Situation Awareness for the HFCS condition will be 
higher than that of the Manual Condition. 
Hypothesis 3: Secondary Task Performance for the HFCS condition will be higher 
than that of the Manual condition. 
Hypothesis 4: Subjective Workload for the HFCS condition will be less than that of 
the Manual condition. 
Hypothesis 5: Automation failure will be detected sooner in the HFCS condition 
when compared to the FA condition. 
Hypothesis 6: Subjects will prefer the HFCS condition over the Manual and the FA 
conditions. 
3  EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
While all results favored the HFCS condition and the hypotheses, only a few of 
those turned out to be statistically significant. All statistical tests were performed 
using IBM© SPSS© Statistics Version 19.0. 
Hypothesis 1: Situation awareness was measured objectively using the SAGAT 
score. While the results favored the hypothesis (FA: Correct = 138, Incorrect = 86; 
HFCS: Correct = 149, Incorrect = 75), a Pearson Chi-Square test of the differences 
between the HFCS condition and the FA conditions was not significant χ2(1, 
N=448) = 1.73, p=.29. 
The post-run questionnaire asked the subject to rate their awareness regarding 
aircraft position, aircraft heading, and the progress of the aircraft with regard to the 
flight plan. Table 1 shows the data. While the raw data favors the hypothesis for all 
three, independent t-tests demonstrated that only the difference for the progress 
awareness question was significant, t(62) = 2.00, p < .05. 
Table 1: Results of Subjective Awareness Assessment 
 FA HFCS
M SD M SD 
Aircraft Position 13.9 4.0 15.1 3.3 
Aircraft Heading 13.6 4.6 13.9 4.5 
Aircraft Progress to Plan 15.3 3.8 16.9 2.4 
 
Hypothesis 2: Comparisons between Manual and HFCS of SAGAT 
measurements for the secondary tasks yielded results that favored the hypothesis 
(HFCS: Correct = 113, Incorrect = 111; Manual: Correct = 101, Incorrect = 123). 
However, these results were not statistically significant χ2(1, N=448) = 1.29, p=.26. 
Hypothesis 3: Again, for this hypothesis, the results all favored HFCS but not 
statistically, although the Math Speed scores approached significance ( t(62) = -
1.85, p = .07). Table 2 shows the raw data. 
Table 2: Results of Secondary Task Performance 
 HFCS Manual 
M SD M SD 
Target Accuracy (% Correct) 81.4 12.5 75.5 18.1 
Math Accuracy (% Correct) 96.6 2.2 96.0 2.9 
Math Speed (Question/min) 4.3 2.0 3.4 2.0 
 
Hypothesis 4: Subjective workload was measured using the NASA-TLX 
workload instrument. The TLX asks the subject to rate six different workload 
categories (Mental, Physical, Temporal, Performance, Effort, and Frustration) using 
a Likert scale with 20 divisions. Table 3 shows the data. Independent t-tests were 
used in comparing the HFCS condition to the Manual condition. Only the Mental 
(t(62) = 4.98, p < .01) and Effort (t(62) = 4.31, p < .01) measures were found to be 
statistically significant.  
Table 3: Results of NASA-TLX 
 HFCS Manual 
M SD M SD 
Mental (lower = better) 12.5 4.0 16.6 2.3 
Physical (lower = better) 8.5 3.9 8.9 4.2 
Temporal (lower = better) 9.0 4.6 9.9 4.5 
Performance (higher = better) 14.1 3.3 13.5 3.5 
Effort (lower = better) 12.5 3.5 15.6 1.9 
Frustration (lower = better) 7.5 4.0 9.3 3.9 
 
Hypothesis 5: All subjects detected the automation failure. An independent t-test 
comparing the two conditions showed that the failures in the HFCS condition were 
detected sooner than the FA condition. This difference was statistically significant 
t(14) = -2.19, p < .05, (HFCS M=26.4 seconds, SD = 7.44; AUTO M=117.0, SD = 
116.78). 
Hypothesis 6: After experiencing all conditions, subjects were asked to choose 
one condition from among the three as their most preferred. They were asked this 
with regard to just the flying task (i.e., if there was no secondary task) and with 
regard to the combined task (i.e., flying and all secondary tasks). Pearson Chi-
square test was used to test for significance. For both flying and combined, the 
subjects preferred the HFCS condition over both the Manual and the FA conditions 
at the .01 significance level.  
Comparing the HFCS condition with the FA condition yielded χ2(2, N = 24) = 
6.86, p < .01 (HFCS = 15, FA = 6) for just the flying task and χ2(2, N = 24) = 6.76, 
p < .01 (HFCS = 16, FA = 7) for the combined tasks.  
Similarly, comparing the HFCS condition with the Manual condition yielded 
χ2(2, N = 24) = 10.54, p < .01 (HFCS = 15, Manual = 3) for just the flying task and 
χ2(2, N = 24) = 20.49, p < .01 (HFCS = 16, Manual = 1) for the combined tasks.  
4  DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To summarize the statistically significant findings: The HFCS condition 
improved flight progress situation awareness over that of FA. The HFCS condition 
caused less Mental workload and Effort when compared to the Manual condition. 
Subjects detected a failure of the automation in the HFCS condition sooner than 
they detected it in the FA condition. Subjects preferred the HFCS condition over 
both the FA and the Manual conditions when considering just flying the aircraft and 
when considering flying the aircraft along with secondary tasks. 
It is also important to note that none of the actual data refuted the hypotheses – 
that is, they just did not pass the test of statistical significance. The number of 
SAGAT probes that could be reasonably used was relatively small (usually only 
three or four per run) and the distribution of answers in the different categories was 
not normal. Since all of the data supported the hypotheses, it may be that the sample 
size was not large enough for sufficient power or that the measurements were not 
sensitive enough.    
Nonetheless, the statistically significant results themselves are impressive and 
they reinforce the claims of increased situation awareness, reduced workload, and 
high pilot preference when using the HFCS. The HFCS holds promise for 
ameliorating many of the human factors problems found in current automation in 
modern flight decks.  
5  FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the future, the power and sensitivity components of the dependent measures 
will be improved to further examine the hypotheses. Also, more mature versions of 
the HFCS including a more robust alerting system will be tested. Other types of 
failures including failures of the alerting system (that is, the subjects will not be 
cued to make a transition) will be tested.  Usability studies will be conducted to 
improve the HFCS interface.  
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